Holism) belongs in the present group or rather than in the group surveyed in the foregoing chapter. For his recognition of the teleological nature of organic activities is somewhat ambiguous. The close affinity of his view with that of R. S. Lillie is obvious, and also its affinity with eniergentism (which Haldane explicitly rejects).

Another author whose doctrine of organisms I class, with some hesitation, in this group is Dr. William Stern, long a leading figure among the psychologists of Germany. Stern has expounded his view at length as a system of philosophy which he calls ' the science of persons' *(Personenuissenschaft)* and makes the foundation of his carefully elaborated system of psychology. He agrees with Haldane and Whitehead in insisting on the wholeness and unity of organisms and on the teleological nature of their activities, and in rejecting both mechanism and vitalism. He distinguishes between persons and things; the former being teleologicallv acting wholes; while the latter are mechanical aggregates. Yet the distinction would seem to be relative ; for even the atom is, in virtue of its organization, a person of a low order occupying a position near the lower end of a hierarchical scale of persons. Whether an electron is also a person of still lower position in the scale is not clear to me. Of the doctrines mentioned in the foregoing pages of this chapter that of Whitehead would seem to be most nearly allied with Stem's. But I cannot pretend that I fully under-stand either of them.

Other psychologists, most notably Dr. C.

S. Myers and the late L. T. Hobhouse, have expounded very similar views. I venture to suggest that all these varieties of Holism are open to the following criticism. How are we to explain the maintenance of the unity which is mani-